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JUN 02 2022

	AFTER 4:00 P.M.	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	David P. Myers (SBN 206137) dmyers@myerslawgroup.com Ann Hendrix (SBN 258285) ahendrix@myerslawgroup.com Marlies D. Mendoza (SBN226021) mmendoza@myerslawgroup.com THE MYERS LAW GROUP, A.P.C. 9327 Fairway View Place, Ste. 100 Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 Telephone: (909) 919-2027 Facsimile: (888) 375-2102 Attorneys for JANE ROE	HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10	COUNTY OF VENTURA	
11	JANE ROE, an individual,	Case No:
13	Plaintiff,	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	THE COUNTY OF VENTURA, a California Government Entity, MICHAEL POWERS, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, inclusive Defendants.	 SEX DISCRIMINATION RACIAL DISCRIMINATION SEXUAL HARASSMENT, HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT RACIAL HARASSMENT, HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT, QUID PRO QUO RETALIATION DEFAMATION FAILURE TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT
2425262728		DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL



INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought by Plaintiff JANE ROE ("Plaintiff") against THE COUNTY OF VENTURA, MICHAEL POWERS, and other as of yet unnamed Defendants (hereinafter collectively "Defendants") alleging, among other things, violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff seeks damages, attorneys' fees and costs of suit.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 1. This Court is the proper court and this action is properly filed in the County of Ventura and in this judicial district because Defendants do business in the County of Ventura and because Defendants' obligations and liability arise therein.
- 2. Plaintiff is an employee of Defendant, the County of Ventura, and a resident of the County of Ventura, State of California.
- 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant the County of Ventura is a California Government Entity, and located in the County of Ventura, State of California.
- 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant, Michael Powers, is a resident the County of Ventura, State of California.
- 5. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of DOES 1 through 10 are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues the DOE Defendants by fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to show their true names and capacities when they have been ascertained.
- 6. On information and belief, each and all of the acts and omissions alleged herein were performed by, or are attributable to, all Defendants, each acting as agents or employees, or under the direction and control of each of the other Defendants, and that said acts and failures to act were within the course and scope

of said agency, employment or direction and control or any combination thereof. On information and belief, Defendants were and are the agents of each other.

- 7. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants complained of herein operated as a joint employer or integrated enterprise, or any combination thereof, with another defendant or other defendants, each such defendant is jointly and severally liable as an employer. In the event that any defendant was acting as the alter ego of another defendant or other defendants such that there is or was such a unity and identity of interest between or among each and all said defendants that adherence to the legal fiction of separate existence would, under the particular circumstances that exist or existed, would sanction fraud or promote injustice, it would be an inequitable result to fail to disregard any such separateness of legal personality.
- 8. On information and belief, Defendants DOES 1 through 10 are the partners, owners, shareholders, or managers of Defendants, and were acting on behalf of Defendants in the payment of wages to Plaintiff.

FACTS COMMON TO MORE THAN ONE CAUSE OF ACTION

- 9. During the allegations as alleged herein, Plaintiff was an employee of the County of Ventura.
 - 10. Plaintiff is of Mexican decent.
- 11. Plaintiff's immediate supervisor was Michael Powers, the Chief Executive Officer of Ventura County.
- 12. On or about January 31, 2019, after a work-related event and dinner, Mr. Powers walked with Plaintiff to her vehicle in a parking garage.
- 13. Mr. Powers then grabbed Plaintiff's hands and kissed her, putting his tongue in her mouth. Plaintiff stopped his unwanted sexual advances.
- 14. Mr. Powers responded by telling Plaintiff that he loved her and wanted to make love to her.
 - 15. Plaintiff refused Mr. Powers advances multiple times.

- 23. After Plaintiff refused all sexual advances by Mr. Powers, Mr. Powers and Plaintiff's professional relationship deteriorated.
- 24. On or about January or February 2020, Mr. Powers called Plaintiff into his office, and once again closed the door.
- 25. He told Plaintiff that he would use every ounce of his being, every dime he had to go after someone that goes after him. Mr. Powers went on to say that he has worked hard and would destroy anyone that comes for him or ruins his good name.
 - 26. Plaintiff sat in shock and was paralyzed by fear.
- 27. At this time, Plaintiff began to be excluded from meetings and other important work-related information that she had previously been apart of and responsible for.
- 28. Mr. Powers ignored Plaintiff and stopped communicating with her regarding her work-related responsibilities and projects.

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- 29. On or about April 2020, Plaintiff became aware that Mr. Powers was telling other employees that Plaintiff was going "rogue" in her employment related duties.
- 30. Plaintiff also discovered that there were rumors that she was having an affair with Mr. Powers.
- 31. The rumors included that Mr. Powers was seen leaving Plaintiff's house, that she was an awful person, that she should not be trusted, and that she had slept her way to the position that she was in.
- 32. Mr. Powers called Plaintiff into his office and proceeded to discuss these rumors with her, as he had also been made aware of them.
- 33. Plaintiff was visibly upset, and Mr. Powers told her just to simply not to listen to them.
- 34. On or about May 2020, Plaintiff went on leave under the Family Medical Leave Act/California Family Rights Act for a medical procedure.
- 35. During this time, Mr. Powers contacted Plaintiff numerous times with work-related questions, asked her to review documents, participate in meetings, and make phone calls.
- 36. Plaintiff was in fear of being terminated by Mr. Powers, so she performed these duties, as she tried to recover from a major medical procedure.
 - 37. Plaintiff returned to work in July 2020.
- 38. On or about July 16, 2021, Mr. Powers called Plaintiff into his office and closed the door.
- 39. Mr. Powers had an upcoming performance evaluation with the Ventura County Board of Supervisors. Mr. Powers was visibly angry, red, and shaking. He had one hand in a closed fist.
- 40. He proceeded to ask Plaintiff if there was anything he should know about.

- 41. Plaintiff was incredibly scared for her safety, overwhelmed, and did not understand what was happening.
- 42. Mr. Powers demanded to know if he should be prepared for anything or know of anything that will come up at his evaluation. Plaintiff was frozen with fear. She told him "no", and Plaintiff immediately left Mr. Powers' office.
- 43. Plaintiff believed that Mr. Powers thought that Plaintiff had made a complaint about him.
- 44. On or about September 17, 2021, Plaintiff was a panelist for interviews being held for the Director of Airports position for the County of Ventura.
- 45. Plaintiff was there with five others, including a Ventura County Human Resources Manager.
- 46. At lunch, Plaintiff was having a salad and a Mexican Coke (Coca-Cola). One of the panelists commented to Plaintiff that he had only seen a certain demographic drink Mexican Coke, and that he can never say, "Mexican Coke", without people getting offended.
- 47. Plaintiff said that the Coke is made in Mexico and that you can say what it is. Plaintiff proceed to read the ingredients and explain why she preferred it to regular Coca-Cola.
- 48. The panelist said that he cannot go into a restaurant and order it without offending others and being called a racist. Plaintiff responded that he could go into a restaurant and order a "Mexican Coke" without being racist because that what it is Coke made in Mexico.
- 49. Plaintiff told him that she is Mexican, and you can say "Mexican Coke".
- 50. The panelist then said that "it better not have actual coke (cocaine) in it", and Plaintiff responded that the old American recipe was the version that had cocaine in it.

- 51. After the conversation about the Mexican Coke with the other panelists, Mr. Powers walked in to introduce himself to the panel.
- 52. The same panelist that had started the discussion regarding the Mexican Coke, said to Mr. Powers, "you better watch out with that one". Mr. Powers responded, "Who? Pico Rivera (Jane Roe)? I am aware of her".
- 53. During that same meeting, after Plaintiff spoke about her concerns with a candidate and his responses, another panelist said to Plaintiff "wow, you're just not another pretty face".
- 54. Mr. Powers called Plaintiff "Pico Rivera (Jane Roe)" on multiple occasions.
- 55. Mr. Powers used that name when Plaintiff voiced concerns at meetings for the lack of resources/services and/or any issues in low income and communities of color.
 - 56. Previously, Mr. Powers had called Plaintiff "Pacoima (Jane Roe)".
- 57. Both Pico Rivera and Pacoima are cities in Los Angeles County that are known for their low income and Latino communities.
- 58. After the day of interviews for Director of Airports and text exchanges regarding the interview panel events with the HR Manager that had been present, Plaintiff reluctantly called her.
- 59. During a conversation with the HR Manager, that HR Manager stated that she was sorry about what had occurred the day before. It was during her conversations with the HR Manager, that Plaintiff expressed her feelings that the harassment the day before was ongoing and that it was not the worse harassment that she had been subjected to.
- 60. Plaintiff complained about the sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and retaliation she had experienced from Mr. Powers.

- 61. That HR Manager notified the Assistant County Executive Officer / Human Resources Director of Plaintiff's complaints. Plaintiff was notified that an investigation was warranted.
- 62. On September 29, 2021, after making her complaints to the Human Resources Department, Plaintiff took a leave of absence. This leave was caused by the stress of the sexual harassment, the comments of race, the stress of reporting Mr. Powers and fearing that he would retaliate against Plaintiff.
- 63. Mr. Powers remained at his position, performing his daily duties in the Executive Office.
- 64. The investigation into the actions of Mr. Powers took approximately five months.
- 65. Plaintiff fully cooperated with the investigation and spent hours being interviewed.
- 66. Plaintiff provided emails, text messages, and other materials and information detailing relevant incidents pertaining to the racial discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation she experienced.
- 67. Plaintiff spent hours searching through her work emails, work calendar, reviewing past work assignments and projects to provide the relevant information requested by the investigator, all while using her own accrued paid time-off.
- 68. Plaintiff is informed and believes that on March 8, 2022, the County of Ventura Board of Supervisors was made aware of the findings of the investigation, and that based on "a preponderance of the evidence", Plaintiff's claims had been substantiated.
- 69. Plaintiff is informed and believes that that same day, Mr. Powers was placed on paid administrative leave.
- 70. Based on information and belief, Plaintiff believes that Mr. Powers knew that the County of Ventura Board of Supervisors was moving toward his

termination, and therefore, he resigned. At the time of his resignation, the County of Ventura circulated a statement from Mr. Powers that he was resigning to spend more time with his family despite the fact that management at the County of Ventura knew that Mr. Powers had just been placed on administrative leave and that he was facing discipline, up to and including, termination.

- 71. Prior to the filing of this complaint, Mr. Powers has made numerous statements and published writings, in which he disseminated false information.
- 72. Mr. Powers had stated that it was Plaintiff who had feelings for him and that she was the one who made romantic overtures toward him.
- 73. Mr. Powers continues to make false statements to the press regarding Plaintiff's behavior, including that she fabricated the allegations against him.
 - 74. Plaintiff continues to fear for her safety.
- 75. Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). On January 31, 2022, the DFEH issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter, attached here as Exhibit A.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Sex Discrimination – Govt. Code §12940(a))

(Plaintiff Against Defendants,

The County of Ventura and DOES 1-10)

- 76. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 75, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 77. The Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") codified in Government Code § 12940 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of the employee's sex.
- 78. Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the FEHA by discriminating against Plaintiff because of her sex.

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- 79. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that her sex was a motivating factor in Defendant's violation of Government Code §12940(a).
- 80. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 81. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 82. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendant may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)
- 83. The actions of Defendant DOES 1 through 10 as alleged herein were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendant's conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.
- 84. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Racial Discrimination – Govt. Code §12940(a))

(Plaintiff Against Defendants,

The County of Ventura and DOES 1-10)

- 85. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 75, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 86. The Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") codified in Government Code § 12940 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of the employee's race.
- 87. Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the FEHA by discriminating against Plaintiff because of her race.
- 88. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that her race was a motivating factor in Defendant's violation of Government Code §12940(a).
- 89. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 90. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 91. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendants may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)

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- 92. The actions of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 as alleged herein were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendant's conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.
- 93. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Sexual Harassment, Hostile Work Environment – Violation of Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12940(j); 12923) (Plaintiff Against All Defendants)

- 94. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 75, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 95. The Fair Employment and Housing Act codified in Government Code § 12940 makes it unlawful for an employer to sexually harass an employee.
- 96. The Fair Employment and Housing Act codified in Government Code § 12923 sets forth the Legislative intent with regard to application of the laws about harassment contained in the FEHA, including that harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.
- 97. Section 12923(a) states, among other things, that harassment creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or intimidating work environment and deprives victims of their statutory right to work in a place free of discrimination when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its

victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's personal sense of well-being.

- 98. Section 12923(b) states, among other things, that a single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
- 99. Section 12923(c) states, among other things, that the existence of a hostile work environment depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an employment decision or uttered by a nondecision maker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
- 100. Section 12923(d) states, among other things, that the legal standard for sexual harassment should not vary by type of workplace. It is irrelevant that a particular occupation may have been characterized by a greater frequency of sexually related commentary or conduct in the past. In determining whether or not a hostile environment existed, courts should only consider the nature of the workplace when engaging in or witnessing prurient conduct and commentary is integral to the performance of the job duties.
- 101. Defendant and each of them and/or their agents/employees engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawful sexual harassment in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act of California Government Code §12940(j).
- 102. The harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of employment and to create a hostile or abusive work environment.
- 103. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the

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104. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

- 105. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendant may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)
- 106. The actions of Defendant Powers and Does 1 through 10 as alleged herein were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendant's conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.
- 107. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Racial Harassment, Hostile Work Environment – Violation of Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12940(j); 12923)

(Plaintiff Against All Defendants)

- 108. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 75, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 109. The Fair Employment and Housing Act codified in Government Code § 12940 makes it unlawful for an employer to harass an employee because of their race.
- 110. The Fair Employment and Housing Act codified in Government Code § 12923 sets forth the Legislative intent with regard to application of the laws about harassment contained in the FEHA, including that harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.
- 111. Section 12923(a) states, among other things, that harassment creates a hostile, offensive, oppressive, or intimidating work environment and deprives victims of their statutory right to work in a place free of discrimination when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's personal sense of well-being.
- 112. Section 12923(b) states, among other things, that a single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
 - 113. Section 12923(c) states, among other things, that the existence of a

hostile work environment depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an employment decision or uttered by a nondecision maker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

- 114. Defendant and each of them and/or their agents/employees engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawful racial harassment in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act of California Government Code §12940(j).
- 115. The harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter conditions of employment and to create a hostile or abusive work environment.
- 116. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 117. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 118. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendants may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)
- 119. The actions of Defendant Powers and DOES 1 through 10 as alleged herein were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such

unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendant's conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.

120. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Sexual Harassment, Quid Pro Quo – Violation of Cal. Gov't Code §12940(j)) (Plaintiff Against All Defendants)

- 121. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 76, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 122. The Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") codified in Government Code §12940 makes it unlawful for an employer to sexually harass an employee.
- 123. Defendant and each of them or their agents/employees, or any combination thereof, engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawful sexual harassment in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act of California Government Code §12940(j).
- 124. Said unlawful practices were in the nature of quid pro quo sexual harassment wherein Plaintiff was subject to the sexually harassing conduct of Defendant's Chief Executive Officer, Michael Powers.
- 125. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
 - 126. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and

each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

- 127. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendants may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)
- herein were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendant's conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.
- 129. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Retaliation - Violation of Cal. Gov't Code §12940(h))

(Plaintiff Against Defendants,

The County of Ventura and DOES 1-10)

- 130. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 76, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
 - 131. Plaintiff engaged in the protected activities of, but not limited to,

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opposing sexual harassment by Mr. Powers.

- 132. Defendant retaliated in violation of the FEHA.
- 133. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 134. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 135. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendant may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)
- were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendant's conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.
- 137. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation –
Violation of Cal. Gov't Code §12940(k))

(Plaintiff Against Defendants,

The County of Ventura and DOES 1-10)

- 138. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 76, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 139. To Plaintiff's knowledge, no meaningful or adequate disciplinary action has been taken against any employees who discriminated, harassed, or retaliated, or any combination thereof, against Plaintiff.
- 140. In violation of Cal. Gov. Code §12940(k), Defendant and each of them, and/or their agents/employees, failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent and investigate unlawful discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation from occurring, and to remedy such discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.
- 141. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 142. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 143. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate such that Defendants may also be aware of its obligations under the law to not engage in discriminatory practices. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under CGC

section 12965(b). Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 241 (Cal. 2013)

- 144. The actions of Defendants DOES 1 through 10 as alleged herein were carried out with malice, willfulness or reckless indifference, or any combination thereof, to the rights of Plaintiff, with full knowledge of their unlawfulness, and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of rights guaranteed under the law. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for the purpose of deterring such unlawful, malicious, oppressive or reckless conduct, or any combination thereof. Defendants' conduct described herein was engaged in by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof, for the Defendant or ratified by officers, directors, or managing agents, or any combination thereof.
- 145. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur attorneys' fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Defamation)

(Plaintiff Against Defendants Michael Powers and DOES 1-10)

- 146. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 76 inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- acts, conspired to, and in fact, did negligently, recklessly, and intentionally caused excessive and unsolicited internal and external publications of defamation, of and concerning Plaintiff, to third persons and to the community. While the precise dates of these publications are not known to Plaintiff, she recently discovered and is informed and believes the publications may have started in February 2019, for the improper purpose of retaliating against her for sex, complaints regarding sexual and racial discrimination and harassment and were later published and foreseeably republished to first cause, and then justify, Plaintiff's accusations. These publications were outrageous, negligent, reckless, intentional, and maliciously published and

republished by Defendant. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the negligent, reckless, and intentional publications by Defendant were and continue to be, foreseeably published and republished by Defendant, their agents and employees, recipients, in the community. Plaintiff hereby seeks damages for these publications and all foreseeable republications discovered up to the time of trial.

- 148. During the above-described time frame, Defendant, conspired to, and in fact, did negligently, recklessly, and intentionally cause excessive and unsolicited publication of defamation, of and concerning Plaintiff, to third persons, who had no need or desire to know. Those third person(s) to whom this Defendant published this defamation are believed to include, but are not limited to, other agents and employees of Defendant, and the community, all of whom are known to Defendant, but unknown at this time to Plaintiff.
- 149. The defamatory publications consisted of oral and written, knowingly false and unprivileged communications, tending directly to injure Plaintiff and Plaintiff's personal, business, and professional reputation. These publications included the following false and defamatory statements (in violation of Civil Code §§ 45 and 46(3)(5)) with the meaning and/or substance that Plaintiff was the one who had feelings for Mr. Powers and that she was the one who made romantic overtures toward him. These and similar statements published by Defendant, expressly and impliedly asserted that Plaintiff fabricated the allegations against him.
- 150. Plaintiff is informed, believes and fears that these false and defamatory per se statements will continue to be published by Defendant, and each of them, and will be foreseeably republished by their recipients, all to the ongoing harm and injury to Plaintiff's business, professional, and personal reputations. Plaintiff also seeks redress in this action for all foreseeable republications, including her own compelled self-publication of these defamatory statements.
 - 151. The defamatory meaning of all of the above-described false and

defamatory statements and their reference to Plaintiff, were understood by these above-referenced third person recipients and other members of the community who are known to Defendant, but unknown to Plaintiff at this time.

- 152. None of Defendant's defamatory publications against Plaintiff referenced above are true.
- 153. The above defamatory statements were understood as assertions of fact, and not as opinion. Plaintiff is informed and believes this defamation will continue to be negligently, recklessly, and intentionally published and foreseeably republished by Defendant, and foreseeably republished by recipients of Defendant's publications, thereby causing additional injury and damages for which Plaintiff seeks redress by this action.
- above) were negligently, recklessly, and intentionally published in a manner equaling malice and abuse of any alleged conditional privilege (which Plaintiff denies existed), since the publications, and each of them, were made with hatred, ill will, and an intent to vex, harass, annoy, and injure Plaintiff in order to justify the illegal and cruel actions of Defendant, to cause further damage to Plaintiff's professional and personal reputation, to retaliate against Plaintiff for prior ill will, rivalry, and disputes in retaliation for her sex, and complaints of sexual and racial discrimination and harassment.
- that no investigation supported the unsubstantiated and obviously false statements. Defendant published these statements knowing them to be false, unsubstantiated by any reasonable investigation and the product of hostile witnesses. These acts of publication were known by Defendant to be negligent to such a degree as to be reckless. In fact, not only did Defendant have no reasonable basis to believe these statements, but he also had no belief in the truth of these statements, and in fact knew the statements to be false. Defendant excessively, negligently, and recklessly

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published these statements to individuals with no need to know, and who made no inquiry, and who had a mere general or idle curiosity of this information.

- 156. The above complained-of publications by Defendant were made with hatred and ill will towards Plaintiff and the design and intent to injure Plaintiff, Plaintiff's good name, her reputation, employment and employability. Defendant published these statements, not with an intent to protect any interest intended to be protected by any privilege, but with negligence, recklessness and/or an intent to injure Plaintiff and destroy her reputation. Therefore, no privilege existed to protect Defendant from liability for any of these aforementioned publications or republications.
- 157. As a proximate result of the publication and republication of these defamatory statements by Defendant, Plaintiff has suffered injury to her personal, business and professional reputation including suffering embarrassment, humiliation, severe emotional distress, anguish, fear, loss of employment, and employability, and significant economic loss in the form of lost wages and future earnings, all to Plaintiff's economic, emotional, and general damage in an amount according to proof.
- 158. Defendant committed the acts alleged herein recklessly, maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring Plaintiff, for an improper and evil motive amounting to malice (as described above), and which abused and/or prevented the existence of any conditional privilege, which in fact did not exist, and with a reckless and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights. All actions of Defendant, his agents and employees, herein alleged were known, ratified and approved by the Defendant. Plaintiff thus is entitled to recover punitive and exemplary damages from Defendant for these wanton, obnoxious, and despicable acts in an amount based on the wealth and ability to pay according to proof at time of trial.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of California Family Rights Act – Govt Code § 12945.2)

(Plaintiff Against Defendants,

The County of Ventura and DOES 1-10)

- 159. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 76, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein.
- 160. At all times herein mentioned, Government Code Section 12945.2 was in full force and effect and was binding upon Defendants. Government Code Section 12945.2(a) states that an employer with at least five employees must provide protected leave of twelve weeks to any employee who has worked for the employer for more than 12 months, and who has worked at least 1,250 hours during the previous 12-month period. Government Code Section 12945.2(t) states that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this section.
- 161. Plaintiff was eligible for CFRA protected leave in May 2020 in both hours worked and time employed by Defendant. Defendants were covered by the CFRA because they employ at least five employees.
- 162. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the acts of Defendant is an unlawful employment practice in violation of the CFRA.
- 163. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 164. As a proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and other general damages, in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 165. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1060, Plaintiff requests this Court to issue a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties. A judicial